



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

Serial: M5/0005/83

14 JAN 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Initiatives to Deal with Leaks

1. We generally concur with the draft recommendations to the DCI on initiatives to deal with leaks attached to SECOM-D-007, dated 10 January 1983.

2. While we support the identified community initiatives and the Terms of Reference, the following comments are offered:

a. Tab A, Other Initiatives: These two initiatives are dismissed as not worth the effort or controversy to enact. If the issue of leaks is a high priority, it would follow that productive initiatives should be pressed. The matter of regulating press contacts has apparently become White House policy. This might be a strong precedent.

b. Tab B, Paragraph 2: The statement "There is ambivalence about them at senior levels." is critical to the theme of these initiatives and the Willard Report, specifically that there has to be a change of attitude about leaks. This stated attitude should be emphasized and identified as an issue for priority administrative resolution.

c. Tab B, Paragraph 11: The initiatives in this paragraph should be stated in a positive manner as is the rest of this paper. We suggest a change in the introductory sentence, e.g., The following initiatives are supported by SECOM members but require action by national authorities. I would also add the following third initiative to this paragraph:

"The third, authorizing the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to conduct investigations under circumstances which may result in the imposition of administrative sanctions rather than criminal prosecution. Unless a leak constitutes a very serious compromise of classified information and the person responsible must be identified to preclude further disclosure, the Department of Justice will not authorize the FBI to investigate. As intelligence agencies either do not have investigative resources or have restrictions on their activities, intelligence agencies may not be able to conduct comprehensive investigations of leaks. This issue is supported by the Willard Report but requires a policy change by the Attorney General permitting the FBI to participate in the investigation of leaks regardless of intent to prosecute."



Alternate NSA Member
DCI Security Committee

STAT



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

**OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20310**

DAMI-CIS

11 January 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Initiatives to Deal with Leaks

1. Reference SECOM-D-007 dated 10 January 1983, subject as above.
2. Concur in the Initiatives with the addition of the following as agreed to by members at the special meeting of 5 January 1983:

On page 16, paragraph 5, add as a final sentence:

Further, members believe it helpful if the DCI publish the Willard Report as a tacit indorsement of the Intelligence Community.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Donald P. Press", is written over the typed name.

DONALD P. PRESS
Colonel, GS
Army Member, SECOM



POLICY

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

11 January 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Initiatives to Deal with Leaks

Reference is made to your memorandum (NOTE FOR) Members, SECOM-D-007, of 10 January 1982 (sic), which attached for review and comment a draft of recommendations to the DCI concerning leaks based upon our special meeting of 5 January 1983. The draft has been reviewed and I do not concur in its submission to the DCI in its present form. My comments are keyed to the pages, hand-numbered, of the WASHFAX copy.

Page 8 - Item 1. Continue to seek White House action on the Willard Report.

In addition to the reported action, the DCI Security Committee, in response to the Chairman's call for opposition to the Department of Defense recommendation, concurred in publication of the Willard Report by the DCI following its approval by the President's National Security Advisor.

In support of the DoD recommendation, the CIA Member expressed his opinion that such publication was a good idea. The Chairman, Unauthorized Disclosures Subcommittee, commented that such publication signed by the Chief Intelligence Officer of the United States and the Attorney General would carry some moral force, at least.

The recommendation offered by the DoD and accepted by the Committee does not appear in your draft. Therefore, I consider the draft to be an incomplete representation of the results of the DCI Security Committee special meeting of 5 January 1983, and ask that the draft be amended by inclusion of the recommendation.

Page 8 - Item 3. Establish and maintain a DCI leak data base for the Community.

My notes reflect that the Committee asked that legal opinions be obtained concerning the storage of certain information about certain categories of persons in such a data base, and that legal opinions be obtained concerning susceptibility of such a data base to actions under the Freedom of Information Act.

Page 11 - Line 3. Correct the spelling of sympotomatic to symptomatic.

Page 14 - Item 2. Line 5. It is recommended that the sentence, "Leaks have evaded solution and have become an increasingly troublesome problem." be changed to something like: "Leaks of intelligence information have become an increasingly troublesome problem which has evaded solution."

Page 14 - Item 3. Line 2. Correct the spelling of Attorny to Attorney.

Page 16 - Item 5. Add the following sentence to the paragraph: "And, unanimously supported publication of the Willard Report by the DCI to emphasize his leak curtailment efforts."

Page 17 - Item 9. Add comments regarding the required legal opinions concerning the storage of certain information about certain categories of persons, and concerning susceptibility of such a data base to actions under the Freedom of Information Act.



Maynard C. Anderson
Director
Security Plans and Programs

Copy to :

Director, Counterintelligence and Investigative Programs , ODUSD(P)
DoD Members, DCI Security Committee

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CONFIDENTIAL

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Security Committee

SECOM-D-007

10 January 1983

NOTE FOR: Members, DCI Security Committee

FROM:

[Redacted]

Chairman

SUBJECT: Initiatives to Deal with Leaks

Attached for your review and comment is a draft of recommendations to the DCI concerning leaks based upon our special meeting of 5 January 1983. Your prompt review and comment upon this draft would be most appreciated. As you know, the DCI has asked for our input by the middle of January; therefore, I must hear from you in time to finalize the draft by the end of this week.

Thank you for your cooperation.

[Redacted]

Attachment

cc: C/UDIS w/att

Regraded Official Use Only When
Separated from Attachment

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Initiatives to Deal with Leaks

FROM:

[Redacted]

Chairman, SECOM

EXTENSION

[Redacted]

NO.

SECOM-D-007

DATE

10 January 1983

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. [Redacted]
CIA Member, SECOM

17 JAN. 83

• I CONCUR IN
TOR PAPER
• BOTH TOR PAPER
& REPORT SHOULD BE
CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL

2. [Redacted]

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DIRECTOR OF SECURITY
17 JAN 1983

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